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1 Introduction
Privatization, the transfer of state-owned assets to the private sector, has prevailed glob-
ally for more than 50 years. Privatization is common for the telecommunications, finance,
transportation, and energy sectors. As a result, private sector development and the privati-
zation of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) has played an important role in many developing
countries and emerging markets such as Brazil, China, Russia, and Vietnam (Cai and Li,
2011; Huang and Yang, 2016; Huang et al., 2017; Fridman, 2018). Privatization applies
to China in a significant way accompanied by R&D spillover and licensing through foreign
direct investment FDI1. The Chinese government began nationwide mixed ownership reform
in 2005 while nurturing a policy intended to make China an “innovation-oriented” country
by 2020 and a “leading science power” by 2050 (Wang et al., 2014b)2.
As one of the key modes of technology diffusion under FDI, innovation spillover has
an absorptive or imitative capacity with regard to advanced technology. It is common to
observe spillovers in the same industry when new technology is introduced. However, the
degree of spillover effect depends on the patent protection and technological sophistication
of the new technology (Heywood and Ye, 2009). As one of the largest countries attract-
ing FDI inflows, China has benefitted from the positive externality of innovation spillover
through FDI inflows since the economic reforms of 1979 (Kuo and Yang, 2008; Abraham
et al.,2010; Jiang et al., 2010; Lin et al., 2009; Liu, 2008). In addition, innovation licens-
ing, another critical channel through which innovation is transferred, is widely observed in
China’s domestic market. For example, in the early 1980s, Ring Round Company, which
is associated with US Western Petroleum, obtained hybrid rice technology via China Seed
Corporation through domestic public licensing. Zoomlion, a Chinese state-owned machin-
1For instance, China used approximately $ 1267.7 billion as FDI inflows in 2015 while the FDI average
for BRIC nations – Brazil, Russia, India, and China – was $ 93.9 billion in 2015. This average was higher
than the world average of $ 29.3 billion, the G7 average of $ 82.8 billion, and the European Union average
of $ 19.1 billion.
2In fact, according to the State Intellectual Property Office of China, from year 2000 to 2012, there were
27,412 license agreements covering 91,551 transferred patents in China.
1
ery enterprise, acquired Jost designs from Germany in June 2011 through foreign private
licensing. Nevertheless, Arrow (1972) notes the negative impact of innovation spillover on
the motivation to innovate, which provides evidence of the essential association between the
two technology diffusion modes under FDI — R&D spillovers and licensing3.
In a mixed market, while numerous studies investigate optimal R&D policies in the
presence of spillover effects, the literature on optimal privatization policies that align with
R&D spillover is limited. Gil-Molto´ et al. (2018) develop a mixed oligopoly model to
examine the role of R&D subsidies and evaluate the welfare effects of privatization. Gil-
Molto´ et al (2011) analyze the use of R&D subsidies in a mixed and private duopoly market
by involving R&D spillovers. Haruna and Goel (2015) examine international mixed duopoly
behavior with research spillovers. Payogo-Theotoky (1995) provide an oligopoly model with
information spillover. However, Heywood and Ye (2009) investigate the incentive for partial
privatization in a mixed duopoly with R&D rivalry. However, licensing is not addressed in
the article.
There is also a strand of literature examining the impact of licensing on privatization
policies in mixed oligopolies4. For instance, Mukherjee and Sinha (2014) find that it is
unnecessary to privatize a public firm if the cost-asymmetry between the duopolists can be
bridged by technology licensing. Wang and Zeng (2019) discuss the impact of domestic pri-
3There are studies that investigate the association between R&D spillovers and licensing in different
directions. Yan and Yang (2018) discuss optimal licensing schemes for a jointly owned enterprise when
facing uncertain R&D outcomes and technology spillover. Bhattacharya and Guriev (2006) develop a two-
stage cumulative R&D model in which a research unit engages in research to produce an interim innovative
idea. Mukherjee (2006) shows the effect of patent protection on R&D investment in the presence of non-
infringing imitation and technology licensing. Yun et al. (2000) examine several types of R&D organization,
including non-cooperative and cooperative R&D, by taking spillover into consideration.
4There is substantial literature discussing the determination of optimal licensing schemes/strategies. For
instance, Heywood et al. (2019) examine an optimal licensing strategy for a welfare-maximizing public firm
to a more efficient competing foreign firm. Ye (2012) investigates and compares optimal public licensing by
means of fixed fee royalties in an international mixed oligopoly. Wang (1998, 2002) studies and compares
licensing through a fixed-fee and licensing using a royalty in a homogeneous and differentiated Cournot
duopoly market, respectively. Chen et al. (2014) explore domestic private licensing strategies by three
different means: a fixed fee, royalties, and a two-part tariff in a mixed oligopoly market. Kim et al. (2018)
examine technology licensing by means of a fixed fee in a mixed duopoly where public and private firms
purchase eco-technology from a foreign innovator.
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vate licensing on the optimal degree of ex-ante privatization in a domestic mixed oligopoly
with entry5. Wang et al. (2019) investigate the impact of both domestic public and for-
eign private licensing on ex-ante privatization policy. Niu (2015) analyzes the influence of
licensing from an external institution privatization policy in a pure monopoly market. A
remarkable assumption of the stated literature is that the innovator firm is more efficient
compared to the licensee firm; that is, the cost asymmetry is reduced due to innovation li-
censing. However, the cost asymmetry between licensor and licensee firms can increase due
to technology licensing if the licensor firm is less efficient compared to the licensee firm6. As
long as the efficiency gains for the licensee overwhelm the cost advantages of the licensor, the
latter may achieve a larger total income from licensing irrespective of whether the licensor
is more or less efficient than the licensee (Wang, 2002). None of the aforementioned arti-
cles address optimal privatization policy with both innovation spillover and licensing given
the increased cost asymmetry between innovator and licensee firms caused by innovation
spillover and licensing7.
Hence, this paper follows Mukherjee and Sinha(2014) and Wang et al. (2019) and exam-
ines the impact of innovation spillover (with no licensing) and licensing (with no spillover)
on the ex-post privatization policies of public firms in an international duopoly8. This pa-
5Ex-ante privatization with technology licensing indicates that the local government optimally chooses
the degree of privatization before determining the optimal licensing contract known as a licensing-then-
privatization model. A few studies focus on privatization and technology licensing in a mixed oligopoly
market and adopt the licensing-then-privatization model, see Wang et al. (2019) and Niu for more details.
6Practically, CSR Corporation Limited and General Electric (GE) established a US-based joint venture
to supply high-speed rail (HSR) passenger trains for two proposed dedicated US HSR corridors in Florida
and California. The partnership represents an investment of approximately $50 million in a joint venture
and public HSR technology licensing for GE in 2010. However, we find that the gross profit margins (GPM)
of CSR and GE were 5.2% and 12.36%, respectively, in 2009, and the GPMs of CSR and GE were 5.6% and
9.35%, respectively, in 2010 (Source: CSR’s annual report and GE’s fact sheet in 2010). Thus, the practical
evidence suggests that domestic public licensing to foreign partners does exist irrespective of whether the
public licensor is more or less efficient than the foreign plant in the Chinese market. Therefore, the cost
asymmetry between CSR and GE is effectively enlarged after public technology licensing.
7Heywood et al. (2019) investigate optimal license contracts by assuming a public firm innovator licenses
to a more efficient foreign rival. However, optimal privatization policy is not addressed in this study.
8See also Dadpay and Heywood (2006), Mukherjee and Suetrong (2009), Wang and Chen (2011), Lin
and Matsumura (2012), Matsumura and Matsushima (2012), Caprino (2013), Wang and Lee (2013), Wang
et al. (2014a) for a mixed oligopoly model including a foreign private firm.
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per includes an exogenous R&D activity under both foreign private and domestic public
innovation, and assumes that the domestic public firm is less efficient than its foreign rival9.
By adopting a licensing-then-privatization model, we assert that local government does not
commit a certain degree of privatization after observing the licensing contract, which is
realistic. The theoretical evidence suggests that foreign private (domestic public) innova-
tion, including spillover and licensing, decreases (increases) the optimal degree of ex-post
privatization due to the reduction (augmentation) of cost asymmetry between the two firms.
Additionally, innovation spillover and licensing have the same directional impact on priva-
tization policies. However, the effect of innovation spillover is weaker than that of licensing
on the degree of privatization if the innovation is not perfectly easily imitated 10.
The remainder of this paper is arranged as follows. We discuss the model in section
2, and foreign private licensing is analyzed in section 3. We investigate domestic public
licensing in section 4, a numerical analysis is presented in section 5, and we offer concluding
remarks in the last section.
2 The Model
We consider an international duopoly market including a domestic public firm (firm 0) and a
foreign private firm (firm 1) 11. Firms produce homogeneous products for which the inverse
demand function is linear; that is,
p = a−Q,
where p is the price, and Q is the total output. The constant marginal cost of firm i, before
R&D innovation, is ci (i = 0, 1). We assume that c0 > c1. That is, initial cost asymmetry
9See also Chinese domestic public licensing of HSR toward the United States for examples where inno-
vators are less efficient compared to foreign licensees mentioned in footnote 6.
10We find that if the innovation spillover is perfect and complete, there is no demand for licensing.
11There is substantial literature on privatization in mixed oligopoly markets. De Fraja and Delbono
(1989), Pal and White (1998), Chang and Ryu (2015), Chang (2007), Chang (2005), Fridman (2018), Han
and Ogawa (2012), Matsumura (1998), Matsumura and Kanda (2005), Matsumura and Okamura (2015),
and Sato and Matsumura (2018), among others, model privatization in a mixed oligopoly.
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between the domestic public firm and the foreign private firm exists12. Firms i exogenously
invest ε2/2 in R&D to develop a non-drastic cost-reducing innovation, which reduces the
marginal cost by ε where 0 < ε < c0 − c1
13. We assume that the appropriability of research
knowledge is imperfect, and there exists an innovation leakage that benefits the rival14.
Thus, by taking R&D activity and associated innovation spillovers into consideration, the
profits of firm i with cost-reducing innovation (pii) and of firm j without cost-reducing
innovation (pij ,i 6= j) are, respectively,
pii = (p− ci + ε) · qi −
ε2
2
pij = (p− cj + φε) · qj,
where qi (qj) is firm i (j)’s output, and φ (∈ [0, 1)) is the degree of innovation spillover. Note
that, φ = 0 represents that innovation remains confidential and private. On the contrary,
φ = 1 indicates that innovation is easily imitated 15. Here, innovation licensing no longer
exists if the innovation is perfectly easy to imitate (i.e., φ = 1). Therefore, we merely
consider φ ∈ [0, 1). Local welfare SW is given by,
SW =
1
2
(q0 + q1)
2 + pi0,
given that private firm 1 is fully foreign-owned. Following Matsumura (1998), the public
firm’s objective function is a convex combination of social surplus and its own profit, θpi0 +
(1−θ)·SW . θ ∈ [0, 1] represents the degree of privatization. In the case of full nationalization
(i.e., θ = 0), firm 0 maximizes welfare. In the case of full privatization (i.e., θ = 1), firm 0
maximizes its profit. The foreign private firm’s objective is profit.
12If c0 ≤ c1, the public monopoly emerges in equilibrium, and there is no room to discuss mixed oligopolies.
We assume that constant marginal costs with a cost disadvantage for a public firm is popular, as in the
literature on mixed oligopolies. See Pal (1998), Mujumdar and Pal (1998), and Matsumura and Ogawa
(2010), for instance. For a discussion on the endogenous cost disadvantage of public firms, see Matsumura
and Matsushima (2004) and Ohnishi (2006). Many empirical studies illustrate that public firms in developing
countries and emerging markets produce less efficiently than private firms. See also Vickers and Yarrow
(1988), Megginson and Netter (2001), and La Porta et al. (2002) for example.
13For R&D innovation setup, see D’ Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), Heywood and Ye (2009), Gil-Molto´
et al. (2011), Gil-Molto´ et al. (2018), and Haruna and Goel (2015).
14See also Haruna and Goel (2015), Gil-Molto´ et al. (2011), and Payogo-Theotoky (1995).
15See also Heywood and Ye (2009), Haruna and Goel (2015).
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We attempt to examine the impact of innovation spillover (in the absence of licensing)
and licensing (in the absence of spillover) on the ex-post privatization policy of the public
firm. Note that unofficial innovation spillover automatically disappears in the presence of
innovation licensing. A three-stage game is considered in this licensing-then-privatization
model16. In the first stage, a licensor firm offers the licensing contract by means of a fixed
fee, (f ∗), to a licensee firm for profit maximization. A licensing contract is signed if neither
the licensor nor the licensee are worse off compared to a situation with no licensing. In
the second stage, the government optimally chooses the degree of privatization (θ∗) in the
domestic public firm to maximize social welfare by observing the optimal level of licensing
contract. In the third stage, these two duopolists engage in Cournot competition. The game
is solved by backward induction. Note that the non-drastic innovation hypothesis; that is,
c0 − ε ≥ c1, holds for foreign private and domestic public innovation cases.
3 Foreign Private Innovation
In this section, the foreign firm is assumed to be the innovator and licensor firm of the cost-
reducing innovation. Therefore, we intend to examine the impact of spillover (in the absence
of licensing) and licensing (in the absence of spillover) under foreign private innovation on
the public firm’s ex-post privatization policy.
3.1 Spillover & No Licensing
We first consider the game with spillover and with no licensing to examine the effect of
innovation spillover and to compare the impact of innovation licensing on privatization
policy under foreign private innovation. The timing of the game with no licensing is as
16Except for Mukherjee and Sinha (2014), Haraguchi and Matsumura (2018) develop a mixed triopoly
to investigate the optimal strategy of private licensing under the presence of ex-post privatization. Xu
et al. (2017) investigate the impact of foreign penetration on both ex-ante and ex-post privatization and
liberalization policies in a free-entry market. Lee et al. (2018) investigate the impact of the timing of
privatization on the optimal degree of ex-post privatization in a free-entry market. Sato and Matsumura
(2018) formulate a two-period model of mixed oligopoly assuming that the local government can change the
optimal degree of privatization after observing the firm-level cost structure.
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follows. In the first stage, the government optimally chooses the degree of privatization. In
the second stage, the two duopolists; that is, the jointly owned public firm, competes with
a foreign rival in Cournot fashion given the innovation spillover effect.
In the quantity competition, the public (foreign) firm chooses the optimal output level
q0 (q1) to maximize the weighted average utility U0 (profit, pi1). The utility of firm 0 is as
follows.
UN0
0
= (1− θ) · SWN0 + θ · piN0
0
, (1)
where superscript “N0” denotes no innovation transfers to public firm 0. Particularly, we
assume foreign firm 1 is the innovator in this section, thus, the profits of both firm 0 and
firm 1 are,
piN0
0
= (a− qN0
0
− qN0
1
− c0 + φε) · q
N0
0
,
piN0
1
= (a− qN0
0
− qN0
1
− c1 + ε) · q
N0
1
−
ε2
2
,
where φε indicates the spillover effect of cost-reducing innovation w.r.t. of the domestic
public firm. As a result, the first-order conditions are listed as,
qN0
0
=
2(a− c0)− θ(a− c1 + ε) + 2φε
θ + 2
, (2)
qN0
1
=
(c0 − c1 + ε) + θ(a− c1 + ε)− φε
θ + 2
. (3)
In the first stage, the local government optimally chooses the privatization level of public
firm 0 to maximize social welfare where
SWN0 =
1
2
· (qN0
0
+ qN0
1
)2 + piN0
0
.
The differentiation of SWN0 w.r.t. the privatization degree θ, generates
∂SWN0
∂θ
=
(2a− c0 − c1 + ε+ φε) · [(c0 − c1 + ε)− θ(3a− 2c0 − c1 + ε+ 2φε)]
(θ + 2)3
Given the satisfaction of the second-order condition, the optimal degree of privatization in
public firm is
θN0 =
c0 − c1 + ε− φε
3a− 2c0 − c1 + ε+ 2φε
. (4)
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Lemma 1 If there is foreign private spillover but no licensing, the optimal degree of priva-
tization in the public firm is partial; that is, θN0 in (4) when a > (4c0 − c1 + ε− 4φε)/3.
Proof See the Appendix.
We explain the intuition behind Lemma 1. The presence of cost asymmetry between the
public firm and foreign firm creates a rationale for privatization (Mukherjee and Sinha,2014;
Matsumura, 1998). On the one hand, privatization leads to a less aggressive inefficient public
firm in terms of production by moving its objective function more toward profit maximiza-
tion. On the other hand, privatization encourages the efficient private firm to produce more,
thus reducing the domestic welfare loss due to production inefficiency. However, in contrast
to Mukherjee and Sinha (2014), the partial privatization policy must be optimal to reduce
the profit transferred to the foreign country in an international duopoly market.
Next, we investigate the effect of exogenous spillover effect on the equilibrium outputs
and on the optimal degree of privatization. Differentiating qN0
0
, qN0
1
, and θN0 in (2), (3),
and (4) respectively, yields,
∂qN0
0
∂φ
=
2ε
θ + 2
,
∂qN0
1
∂φ
= −
ε
θ + 2
,
∂QN0
∂φ
=
ε
θ + 2
,
∂θN0
∂φ
= −
3ε · (a− c1 + ε)
(3a− 2c0 − c1 + ε+ 2φε)2
.
(5)
From (5), we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 2 qN0
0
and QN0 are increasing in φ, and qN0
1
and θN0 are decreasing in φ.
We now explain the intuition. An increase in spillover effect, φ, reduces the initial cost
asymmetry between public firm 0 and foreign firm 1 given the assumption c0 − c1 > ε.
Therefore, the increase in innovation spillover improves the production inefficiency of the
public firm, induces the public firm to be more aggressive (decreases θN0), and produces
more (increases qN0
0
) when φ is larger (direct effect). Through the strategic interaction
between the duopolists, firm 1 produces less when firm 0 produces more. Therefore, an
increase in φ decreases qN0
1
(the indirect effect). Since the direct effect is stronger than the
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indirect effect, QN0 is increasing in φ.
3.2 Licensing & No Spillover
In this subsection, we consider the presence of innovation transfers from foreign firm 1 to
public firm 0 with ex-post privatization where both firms make licensing decisions before
the government’s privatization decision. Note that innovation licensing only occurs if it
renders both the innovator (foreign firm 1) and licensee (public firm 0) better off compared
to the situation where no innovation is transferred. Accordingly, the innovation spillover
effect disappears in this case due to the official foreign licensing toward the domestic public
enterprise. The timing of the game is as stated previously.
In the quantity competition, with the presence of innovation transfers, the profits of
public firm 0 and foreign firm 1 are
piL0
0
= (a− qL0
0
− qL0
1
− c0 + ε) · q
L0
0
− fL0, (6)
piL0
1
= (a− qL0
0
− qL0
1
− c1 + ε) · q
L0
1
−
ε2
2
+ fL0. (7)
where the superscript “L0” denotes licensing to public firm 0. Thus, the public firm 0
(foreign firm 1) chooses an output level to maximize its utility (profit) where
UL0
0
= (1− θ) · SWL0 + θ · piL0
0
, (8)
and the domestic welfare is
SWL0 =
1
2
(
qL0
0
+ qL0
1
)2
+ piL0
0
. (9)
As a result, the first-order conditions in the third stage are listed as.
qL0
0
=
2(a− c0 + ε)− θ(a− c1 + ε)
θ + 2
, (10)
qL0
1
=
c0 − c1 + θ(a− c1 + ε)
θ + 2
. (11)
In the second stage, the government optimally chooses the degree of privatization to
maximize welfare given the presence of technology licensing from foreign firm 1 to public
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firm 0, which yields,
∂SWL0
∂θ
=
(2a− c0 − c1 + 2ε) · [(c0 − c1)− θ(3a− 2c0 − c1 + 3ε)]
(θ + 2)3
By setting ∂SWL0/∂θ = 0, given the satisfaction of the second-order condition, we have
θL0 =
c0 − c1
3a− 2c0 − c1 + 3ε
. (12)
Due to the prior literature on technology licensing (e.g., Wang and Zeng, 2019 and Wang,
1998), the innovator (foreign firm 1 in this section) is a dominant player in the licensing
game and can extract the licensee’s (public firm 0) entire benefit from innovation transfers.
Therefore, the maximum license fee foreign firm 1 can charge is solved by fL0 = UL0
0
−UN0
0
given the equilibrium outcomes of UL0
0
from (8) and UN0
0
from (1). However, the fixed fee is a
lump-sum transfer from public firm 0 to foreign firm 1 under foreign private licensing. Hence,
the fixed fee cannot affect the output equilibrium level and the degree of privatization. The
equilibrium fL0 is presented in (19) in the appendix. By assuming the motivation of foreign
private licensing, this discussion leads to the following lemma.
Lemma 3 If there is foreign private licensing but no spillover, the optimal degree of ex-post
privatization is partial; that is, θL0 in (12) when a > (4c0 − c1 − 3ε)/3.
Proof See the Appendix.
Under foreign private licensing, the cost asymmetry between the two duopolists de-
creases. However this cost-reducing innovation is non-drastic, which creates a rationale for
privatization. In addition, by examining the degree of privatization with spillover & no
licensing and the degree of privatization with licensing & no spillover, we find the spillover
and licensing of foreign private innovation affects the degree of ex-post privatization as fol-
lows.
Proposition 1 (i) Compared to no spillover (i.e., φ = 0), unofficial innovation leakage
from foreign private innovation reduces the optimal level of privatization in the domestic
public firm; (ii)compared to no licensing, foreign private licensing to the domestic public
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firm further reduces the optimal degree of ex-post privatization if a > (4c0 − c1 − 3ε)/3;
(iii) the impact of innovation spillover on the optimal degree of privatization can be exactly
the same as that of innovation licensing on the optimal degree of privatization under foreign
private innovation as long as the cost-reducing innovation is completely easy to imitate (i.e.,
φ = 1).
Proof See the Appendix and Figure 1.
The intuition is straightforward. Given the cost asymmetry between the licensee (firm 0)
and the innovator (firm 1); that is, c0− c1 > ε, the initial cost differential is reduced due to
either innovation spillover or foreign private licensing. First, when cost-reducing innovation
unofficially spills from the foreign firm to the public firm, aligned with the absence of
foreign private licensing, the public firm becomes more aggressive (decreasing in θN0) to
increase output in terms of production, and efficiency improvements reduce the marginal
cost to c0 − φε. However, as long as the innovation is not completely easily imitated, (i.e.,
0 < φ < 1), foreign private licensing must further reduce the cost asymmetry between the
two firms. In other words, compared to unofficial innovation leakage, foreign private licensing
could fully improve the production inefficiency of the domestic public firm by reducing its
marginal cost to c0 − ε. As a result, the profit margin of the public firm increases. Hence,
the benefit of privatization is diminished, indicating a further decrease in the degree of
privatization. That is, from θN0
∣∣
0<φ<1
to θL0 given the presence of cost-reductions via both
innovation spillover and licensing17. Figure 1 illustrates the fact discussed above. The figure
also shows that foreign private licensing is unnecessary if the innovation spillover is fully
complete (i.e., φ = 1). That is, as φ increases, θN0
∣∣
0<φ<1
closes to θL0.
17Mukherjee and Sinha (2014) reveal full nationalization as the optimal policy with the presence of
domestic private licensing in an ex-post privatization model due to the absence of cost asymmetry between
firms. In contrast, Wang et al. (2019) show that foreign private licensing increases the optimal degree of
privatization by adopting a privatization-then-licensing model.
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Figure 1: Spillover, Licensing, and Degrees of Privatization
Note: θN1 (θN0) denotes the optimal degree of ex-post privatization when there is spillover but
no domestic public (foreign private) licensing toward the foreign private firm, firm 1 (domestic
public firm, firm 0). θL1 (θL0) represents the optimal degree of ex-post privatization when there is
domestic public (foreign private) licensing toward the foreign private firm, firm 1 (domestic public
firm, firm 0). In addition, φ = 0 indicates the absence of innovation spillover; 0 < φ < 1 signals
imperfect/incomplete spillover effect; φ = 1 illustrates perfect spillover effect.
4 Domestic Public Innovation
In this section, the domestic public firm is assumed to be the innovator and licensor firm of
the cost-reducing innovation. Therefore, we intend to examine the impact of spillover (with
the absence of licensing) and licensing (with the absence of spillover) under domestic public
innovation on the ex-post privatization policy of this public firm.
4.1 Spillover & No Licensing
The benchmark game of domestic public innovation is examined in this subsection to inves-
tigate the effect of innovation spillover and to compare the impact of innovation licensing
on privatization under domestic public innovation. The timing is the same as in section
3.1. Note that although the public firm is the innovator of the cost-reducing technology,
the cost asymmetry between firm 0 and firm 1 still exists; that is, c0 − c1 > ε. In fact,
the cost differential between the public and foreign firm is further increased by either in-
novation leakage or domestic public licensing under the assumption c0 − c1 > ε. However,
12
despite being relatively inefficient compared to the foreign private licensee, the domestic
public innovator/licensor can extract some of the efficiency gain through fixed fee licensing.
When the benefit extracted from licensing overwhelms the cost advantage of the licensor,
the inefficient licensor is motivated to license to obtain a larger total income (Wang, 2002).
The profits of both licensor and licensee change as follows.
piN1
0
= (a− qN1
0
− qN1
1
− c0 + ε) · q
N1
0
−
ε2
2
piN1
1
= (a− qN1
0
− qN1
1
− c1 + φε) · q
N1
1
where the superscript “N1” denotes no technology licensing to the foreign firm 1. Therefore,
the utility of public firm 0 is
UN1
0
= (1− θ) · SWN1 + θ · piN1
0
, and domestic welfare is thus,
SWN1 =
1
2
(
qN1
0
+ qN1
1
)2
+ piN1
0
, (13)
given private firm 1 is totally foreign. In the last stage, the foreign firm 1 (public firm 0)
optimally chooses quantity to maximize its profit, piN1
1
(utility, UN1
0
), where the equilibrium
production quantity from the last stage is
qN1
0
=
2(a− c0 + ε)− θ(a− c1 + φε)
θ + 2
, (14)
qN1
1
=
(c0 − c1 − ε) + θ(a− c1 + φε) + φε
θ + 2
. (15)
In the first stage, local government optimally chooses the privatization level of public firm
0 to maximize social welfare in (13). The differentiation of SWN1 w.r.t. the privatization
degree, θ, generates,
∂SWN1
∂θ
=
(2a− c0 − c1 + ε+ φε) · [(c0 − c1 − ε+ φε)− θ(3a− 2c0 − c1 + 2ε+ φε)]
(θ + 2)3
.
13
Given the satisfaction of the second-order conditions, the optimal degree of privatization in
public firm 0 with innovation spillover and no domestic public licensing is
θN1 =
c0 − c1 − ε+ φε
3a− 2c0 − c1 + 2ε+ φε
. (16)
Lemma 4 If there is domestic public spillover but no licensing in an international
duopoly market, the optimal degree of privatization in public firm is partial; that is, θN1
in (16) when a > (4c0 − c1 − 4ε+ φε)/3.
Proof See the Appendix.
We can explain the intuition as follows. When a foreign firm has an initial technology
advantage (i.e., c0 − c1 > ε), the cost asymmetry between domestic public and foreign
private firms is enlarged aligning with the unofficial innovation spillover (that is, φε). In
other words, the public innovator is even less efficient relative to the foreign licensee. Thus, a
partial privatization policy would help to reduce the output of the public firm, thus reducing
production inefficiency created by the sharp cost asymmetry between these two firms.
In addition, we now discuss the effect of exogenous spillover effect on the equilibrium
outputs and the optimal degree of privatization under domestic public innovation. Differ-
entiating qN1
0
, qN1
1
and θN1 in (14), (15), and (16), respectively, which yields,
∂qN1
0
∂φ
= −
θε
θ + 2
,
∂qN1
1
∂φ
=
ε(θ + 1)
θ + 2
,
∂QN1
∂φ
=
ε
θ + 2
,
∂θN1
∂φ
=
3ε · (a− c0 + ε)
(3a− 2c0 − c1 + 2ε+ φε)2
.
(17)
From (17), we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 5 qN1
1
and θN1 are increasing in φ, and qN1
0
and QN1 are decreasing in φ.
The intuition is straightforward. An increase in the spillover effect, φ, enlarges the initial
cost asymmetry between public firm 0 and foreign firm 1 given the assumption c0 − c1 > ε.
Therefore, the increasing innovation spillover deteriorates the relative production inefficiency
of the public firm to its foreign rival and induces the efficient foreign firm 1 to produce
more when φ gets larger (direct effect)18. Through the strategic interaction between these
18The spillover effect directly impacts the foreign private firm.
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two duopolists, the public firm 0 is less aggressive (increasing in θN1) and producing less
(decreasing in qN1
0
) as φ increases (indirect effect). Since the direct effect is stronger than
the indirect effect, QN1 is increasing in φ.
4.2 Licensing & No Spillover
In this subsection, we investigate the impact of domestic public licensing on the optimal
degree of ex-post privatization under a licensing-then-privatization model. The three-stage
game, which is exactly the same as the game in section 3.2, is solved again by backward
induction. In the quantity competition, with domestic public licensing, the profits of both
the innovator and licensee are as follows.
piL1
0
= (a− qL1
0
− qL1
1
− c0 + ε) · q
L1
0
−
ε2
2
+ fL1,
piL1
1
= (a− qL1
0
− qL1
1
− c1 + ε) · q
L1
1
− fL1.
where fL1 is the fixed fee charged by the public firm 0 due to the licensing contract. The
superscript “L1” denotes technology licensing to foreign firm 1. In addition, the utility of
public firm and domestic welfare are, respectively,
UL1
0
= (1− θ) · SWL1 + θ · piL1
0
SWL1 =
1
2
(
qL1
0
+ qL1
1
)2
+ piL1
0
The equilibrium outputs from the third stage, chosen by maximizing profit/utility, are
qL1
0
=
2(a− c0 + ε)− θ(a− c1 + ε)
θ + 2
qL1
1
=
(c0 − c1) + θ(a− c1 + ε)
θ + 2
In the second stage, the government optimally chooses the degree of privatization to maxi-
mize welfare given the presence of technology licensing from public firm 0 to foreign firm 1,
which generates
∂SW
∂θ
=
(2a− c0 − c1 + 2ε) · [(c0 − c1)− θ(3a− 2c0 − c1 + 3ε)]
(θ + 2)3
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By letting ∂SW/∂θ = 0, due to the satisfaction of the second-order condition, the optimal
degree of privatization in the second stage is,
θL1 =
c0 − c1
3a− 2c0 − c1 + 3ε
(18)
Since public firm 0 is the innovator in this case, we can extract the foreign firm 1’s entire
benefit from technology licensing19. Hence, in the first stage, the maximum fixed fee the
public licensor can charge is,
fL1 = piL1
1
− piN1
1
=
4ε(1− φ)(2c0 − 2c1 − ε+ φε)
9
.
Note that the motivation for technology licensing from public firm 0 to foreign firm 1 exists;
that is, UL1
0
− UN1
0
> 0 if (4c0 − c1 − 3ε)/3 < a < (23c0 − 20c1 − 13ε)/3 at the equilibrium
level.
Lemma 6 If there is domestic public licensing but no spillover, the optimal degree of ex-post
privatization is partial; that is, θL1 in (18) when (4c0−c1−3ε)/3 < a < (23c0−20c1−13ε)/3.
Proof See the Appendix.
The intuition can be explained as follows. There may be limited room for the discussion
of domestic public licensing given that the domestic public innovator is inefficient initially,
and the cost asymmetry between the two duopolists cannot be bridged by technology in-
novation. However, note that, the domestic public licensor can extract some efficiency gain
from the licensing payment. As long as the efficiency extracted from the foreign licensee
overwhelms the cost advantages lost by the public innovator due to technology licensing, the
public innovator is motivated to license the cost-reducing innovation to its foreign rivals to
19We find that θL0 in (12) is equal to θL1 in (18). The main reason is that under both foreign private and
domestic public licensing, the profit margin of the two firms is exactly the same. The difference between the
model setups in foreign private licensing and domestic public licensing is the direction of fixed fee payments
and the cost of R&D activity. Since fixed fee payments are a transfer from licensee to innovator, and the
R&D cost is exogenous, they cannot influence the optimal level of ex-post privatization. Thus, we have
θL0 = θL1, which is reasonable.
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achieve more total profit (Wang, 2002)20. However, a rationale for privatization is created
by domestic public licensing in terms of the increased cost asymmetry triggered by domestic
public licensing.
Next, by examining the degree of privatization with spillover & no licensing and the
degree of privatization with spillover with licensing & no spillover, we find that the spillover
and licensing of domestic public innovation affects the degree of ex-post privatization as
follows.
Proposition 2 (i) Compared to no spillover (i.e., φ = 0), unofficial innovation leakage
from domestic public innovation increases the optimal level of privatization in domestic
public firms; (ii) compared to no licensing, domestic public licensing to a foreign private
firm further increases the optimal degree of ex-post privatization if (4c0 − c1 − 3ε)/3 < a <
(23c0 − 20c1 − 13ε)/3; (iii) the impact of spillover on the optimal degree of privatization
can be exactly the same as the impact of spillover of licensing on the optimal degree of
privatization under domestic public innovation as long as the cost-reducing innovation is
completely easy to imitate (i.e., φ = 1).
Proof See the Appendix and Figure 1.
The intuition is straightforward. Given the cost asymmetry between the innovator (firm
0) and the licensee (firm 1); that is, c0 − c1 > ε, the initial cost differential is increased due
to innovation spillover or domestic public licensing. First, when cost-reducing innovation
unofficially spills from a public firm to a foreign firm, aligned with the absence of licensing,
the public firm becomes less aggressive (an increase in θN1) to decrease the output in terms of
a deterioration in relative production inefficiency compared to its foreign rival. Nevertheless,
as long as the innovation is not completely easily imitated, (i.e., 0 < φ < 1), the domestic
public licensing must further increase the cost asymmetry between the two firms. In other
words, compared to unofficial innovation leakage, domestic public licensing could fully reduce
20Wang et al. (2019) demonstrate the presence and validity of domestic public licensing in the ex-ante
privatization model under the assumption that the domestic public firm is more efficient than the foreign
private firm.
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the marginal cost of the foreign private firm to c1− ε. As a result, the relative profit margin
of the public firm compared to its foreign rival decreases. Hence, the benefit of privatization
increases indicating a further rise in the degree of privatization; that is, from θN1
∣∣
0<φ<1
to
θL1 given the presence of cost reductions via both innovation spillover and licensing. Figure
1 illustrates the fact investigated above and shows that it is unnecessary for domestic public
licensing if the innovation spillover is fully complete (i.e., φ = 1). That is, as φ increases,
θN1
∣∣
0<φ<1
closes to θL1.
5 Numerical Analysis
In this section, we compute the optimal levels of ex-post privatization with innovation
spillovers and with innovation licensing by parameter specification. To be more specific,
the numerical result of foreign private (domestic public) innovation is presented in Panel A
(B). For instance, θN0
∣∣
φ=1/3
(
θN1
∣∣
φ=1/3
)
in Table 1 represents the optimal degrees of privati-
zation when a foreign private (domestic public) firm innovates this cost-reducing technology
in (4) (in (16)) given that the effect of unofficial innovation leakage is one third of the offi-
cial innovation licensing (i.e., φ = 1/3). Particularly, θN0
∣∣
φ=0
represents the optimal degree
of ex-post privatization under foreign private innovation in the absence of both innovation
spillover and licensing. Additionally, θL0 (θL1) represents the optimal degree of ex-post pri-
vatization in the presence of foreign private (domestic public) licensing in (12) (in (18)).
Note that the domain of market size (a) is computed based on the parameter specification
of c0 and c1 aligned with the restrictions from each lemma and proposition.
Under foreign private innovation (Panel A of Table 1), the cost asymmetry between
the domestic public and foreign private firm is reduced when either innovation spillover or
foreign private licensing occurs. Therefore, we find that the optimal degree of ex-post pri-
vatization decreases due to the increase in the spillover effect of foreign private innovation.
In addition, the privatization level further decreases in terms of improvements in the pro-
duction inefficiency of the domestic public firm induced by foreign private licensing. On the
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Table 1: Optimal Degrees of Ex-post Privatization
Foreign Private Innovation Domestic Public Innovation
Panel A Panel B
a θN0
∣∣
φ=0
θN0
∣∣
φ= 1
3
θN0
∣∣
φ= 2
3
θL0 a θN1
∣∣
φ=0
θN1
∣∣
φ= 1
3
θN1
∣∣
φ= 2
3
θL1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
6.1 0.1214 0.1070 0.0920 0.0800 6.1 0.0483 0.0591 0.0697 0.0800
6.2 0.1189 0.1048 0.0913 0.0784 6.2 0.0473 0.0579 0.0683 0.0784
6.3 0.1164 0.1027 0.0895 0.0769 6.3 0.0464 0.0568 0.0670 0.0769
6.4 0.1141 0.1007 0.0878 0.0755 6.4 0.0455 0.0557 0.0657 0.0755
6.5 0.1118 0.0987 0.0861 0.0741 6.5 0.0446 0.0546 0.0644 0.0741
6.6 0.1097 0.0968 0.0845 0.0727 6.6 0.0438 0.0536 0.0633 0.0727
6.7 0.1076 0.0950 0.0830 0.0714 6.7 0.0429 0.0526 0.0621 0.0714
6.8 0.1056 0.0933 0.0815 0.0702 6.8 0.0422 0.0517 0.0610 0.0702
6.9 0.1037 0.0916 0.0801 0.0690 6.9 0.0414 0.0508 0.0600 0.0690
7.0 0.1018 0.0900 0.0787 0.0678 7.0 0.0407 0.0499 0.0589 0.0678
Note: Panel A (B) verifies lemma 2(5) and proposition 1 (2). Thus the domain of market size (a) follows the
condition; that is, 4c0−3c1−ε < a < (23c0−20c1−13ε)/3 where 4c0−3c1−ε = 5.1 and (23c0−20c1−13ε)/3 =
7.8 under the specification of c0 = 2, c1 = 0.8, and ε = 0.5.
contrary, under domestic public innovation (Panel B in Table 1), the cost asymmetry be-
tween the domestic public and foreign private firm is enlarged by either innovation spillover
or domestic public licensing, which further deteriorates the relative production inefficiency
of the public firm compared to the foreign firm. Hence, the privatization level increases due
to the worsening of the production inefficiency of the domestic public firm induced by either
spillover or licensing under domestic public innovation.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we investigated the following research questions. Does innovation spillover
and licensing under foreign private (domestic public) innovation play a role in determining
the optimal degree of ex-post privatization of the domestic firm in an international duopoly
market? How do they interact in determining privatization policies? We find the answers
to be positive and interesting. We introduced a licensing-then-privatization model and
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assumed that the local government does not commit to a certain degree of privatization.
We demonstrated that the spillover and licensing due to foreign private (domestic public)
innovation reduces (increases) the degree of ex-post privatization in terms of improvements
(deterioration) in the relative production inefficiency of domestic public firms compared to
their foreign rivals. In addition, innovation spillover and licensing have the same impact
direction on privatization policies. However, the effect of innovation spillover is weaker
than that of licensing on the degree of privatization if the innovation is not perfectly easily
imitated.
This study provides insights into mixed ownership reform with respect to SOEs in non-
strategic industries in China given that many sectors in the Chinese market face technology
innovation decisions. However, our model and the related results are subject to a number
of shortcomings. Constant returns to scale, linear preferences, and the consideration of a
duopoly market without entry are some important limitations. However, we consider our
results to be suggestive, and similar results would hold under broader contexts at the cost
of a substantial increase in the analysis complexities.
20
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
To keep θN0 in (4) valid, the equilibrium output from both firm 0 and firm 1 will be positive;
that is,
qN0∗
0
=
3a− 4c0 + c1 − ε+ 4φε
3
qN0∗
1
=
2c0 − 2c1 + 2ε− 2φε
3
> 0
Obviously, qN0∗
1
is greater than zero, and qN0∗
0
> 0 if a > (4c0 − c1 + ε− 4φε)/3.
Proof of Lemma 3
First, to keep θL0 in (12) valid, the equilibrium output from both firm 0 and firm 1 should
be positive; that is,
qL0∗
0
=
3a− 4c0 + c1 + 3ε
3
,
qL0∗
1
=
2(c0 − c1)
3
> 0
Obviously, qL0∗
1
is greater than zero, and qL0∗
0
> 0 if a > (4c0 − c1 − 3ε)/3.
Second, the maximum license fee a foreign firm can charge is,
[
18(2a− c0 − c1 + 2ε)
2
ε · (1− φ)
]
· fL0 = 128ac2
0
− 180a2c0 − 16ac
2
1
− 36a2c1 − 8c0c
2
1
− 44c2
0
c1 + 126aε
2
+171a2ε− 129c0ε
2 + 114c2
0
ε+ 3c1ε
2 − 24c2
1
ε+ 45φε3 + 72a3
−28c3
0
+ 8c3
1
+ 27ε3 + 90aφε2 + 45a2φε− 51c0φε
2 + 14c2
0
φε
−39c1φε
2 + 8c2
1
φε+ 104ac0c1 − 309ac0ε− 33ac1ε+ 81c0c1ε
−51ac0φε− 39ac1φε+ 23c0c1φε. (19)
Second, to keep the validity of the optimal degree of ex-post privatization in (12), the
motivation of foreign private licensing will exist. That is, piL0
1
− piN0
1
shall be greater than
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zero, meaning that the foreign licensor is not worse off after fixed fee licensing; that is,
∆pi1 = pi
L0
1
− piN0
1
=
ε(1− φ)
18(2a− c0 − c1 + 2ε)2
· Ω > 0, (20)
where
Ω = 192ac2
0
− 244a2c0 − 80ac
2
1
+ 28a2c1 + 8c0c
2
1
− 60c2
0
c1 + 62aε
2 + 139a2ε− 161c0ε
2 + 170c2
0
ε
+99c1ε
2 − 96c2
1
ε+ 77φε3 + 72a3 − 44c3
0
+ 24c3
1
− 5ε3 + 154aφε2 + 77a2φε− 83c0φε
2 + 22c02φε
−71c1φε
2 + 16c2
1
φε+ 104ac0c1 − 405ac0ε+ 127ac1ε+ 65c0c1ε− 83ac0φε− 71ac1φε+ 39c0c1φε
Accordingly, the occurrence of foreign private licensing requires Ω > 0. With this assump-
tion, the optimal degree of ex-post privatization under foreign private licensing is valid.
Proof of Propositions 1
The optimal degrees of privatization with or without spillover effect from (4) are as follows,
θN0
∣∣
spillover
=
c0 − c1 + ε− φε
3a− 2c0 − c1 + ε+ 2φε
, if 0 ≤ φ < 1
θN0
∣∣
no spillover
=
c0 − c1 + ε
3a− 2c0 − c1 + ε
, if φ = 0
Obviously, θN0
∣∣
spillover
< θN0
∣∣
no spillover
. Proposition 1 (i) is proved. In addition, the
comparison between θN0 in (4) and θL0 in (12) generates
θL0 − θN0 =
3ε(φ− 1)(a− c1 + ε)
(3a− 2c0 − c1 + 3ε) · (3a− 2c0 − c1 + ε+ 2φε)
< 0, given 0 ≤ φ < 1,
when a > (4c0 − c1 − 3ε)/3. Therefore, we obtain θ
L0 < θN0
∣∣
spillover
< θN0
∣∣
no spillover
.
Proposition 1 (ii) is proved. Third, θN0
∣∣
spillover
= θL0 if φ = 1. Proposition 1 (iii) is proved.
Proof of Lemma 4
To keep θN1 in (16) valid, the equilibrium output from both firm 0 and firm 1 must be
positive; that is,
qN1∗
0
=
3a− 4c0 + c1 + 4ε− φε
3
qN1∗
1
=
2(c0 − c1 − ε+ φε)
3
> 0
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Obviously, qN1∗
1
is greater than zero given c0 − c1 > ε. Additionally, q
N1∗
0
> 0 if a >
(4c0 − c1 − 4ε+ φε)/3.
Proof of Lemma 6
First, to keep θL1 in (18) valid, the equilibrium output from both firm 0 and firm 1 must be
positive; that is,
qL1∗
0
=
3a− (4c0 − c1 − 3ε)
3
,
qL1∗
1
=
2(c0 − c1)
3
> 0.
Obviously, qL1∗
1
is greater than zero. Additionally, qL0∗
0
> 0 if a > (4c0 − c1 − 3ε)/3.
Second, to keep the validity of the optimal degree of ex-post privatization in (18), the
motivation for domestic public licensing must exist. That is, UL1
0
− UN1
0
must be greater
than zero, meaning the domestic licensor is not worse off after fixed fee licensing. That is,
∆U0 = U
L1
0
− UN1
0
= −
ε(1− φ)(3a− 23c0 + 20c1 + 13ε− 10φε)
18
> 0. (21)
The positivity of ∆U0 in (21) requires a < (23c0 − 20c1 − 13ε+ 10φε)/3. Thus, θ
L1 in (18)
is valid if (4c0 − c1 − 3ε)/3 < a < (23c0 − 20c1 − 13ε)/3.
Proof of Proposition 2
The optimal degrees of privatization with or without spillover effect from (16) are as follows,
θN1
∣∣
spillover
=
c0 − c1 − ε+ φε
3a− 2c0 − c1 + 2ε+ φε
, if 0 ≤ φ < 1
θN1
∣∣
no spillover
=
c0 − c1 − ε
3a− 2c0 − c1 + 2ε
, if φ = 0
where
θN1
∣∣
spillover
− θN1
∣∣
no spillover
=
3φε(a− c0 + ε)
(3a− 2c0 − c1 + 2ε) · (3a− 2c0 − c1 + 2ε+ φε))
> 0
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Thus, we have θN1
∣∣
spillover
> θN1
∣∣
no spillover
. Proposition 2 (i) is proved. In addition, the
comparison between θN1 in (16) and θL1 in (18) generates
θL1 − θN1 =
3ε(1− φ)(a− c0 + ε)
(3a− 2c0 − c1 + 3ε) · (3a− 2c0 − c1 + 2ε+ φε)
> 0, given 0 ≤ φ < 1,
when (4c0 − c1 − 3ε)/3 < a < (23c0 − 20c1 − 13ε)/3. We also obtain θ
L1 > θN1
∣∣
spillover
>
θN1
∣∣
no spillover
. Proposition 2 (ii) is proved. Third, θN1
∣∣
spillover
= θL1 if φ = 1. Proposition
2 (iii) is proved.
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